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Unfair Labor Practice and Contract Aspects of an
Employer's Desire to Close, Partially Close, or
Relocate Bargaining Unit Work
I.

INTRODUCTION

Complete or partial plant closings, relocations of work, subcontracting and automation are some of the business judgments implemented in response to technological advancements, competition,
or a sluggish economy. One of the consequences of such managerial
decisions is loss of employment. The employer often knows that
layoffs will be necessary, but ordinarily his obligations prior to and
following reorganizational efforts are unclear. When potentially af-

fected employees are non-union, the employer retains the maximum flexibility in performing necessary changes.' On the other
hand, when his employees are unionized it is in the best interest of

the employer to assess closely the constraints of the National Labor Relations Act,2 and the terms and conditions of his collective
bargaining agreement 3 before taking actions which may affect the
rights of his employees and possibly subject him to liability.

This comment will discuss the evolution of statutory law and
case law in the area of unfair labor practice and contract aspects of
1. Irving, Closings and Sales of Business: A Settled Area? 33 LAB. L.J. 218 (1982). The
author, formerly NLRB General Counsel thoroughly discusses the labor law and contract
aspects of business sales and closings focusing on only two cases: First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (where the court held that, while an employer is
obligated to bargain over the effects of a partial closing decision, it is under no duty to
bargain with respect to the decision itself), and Local Lodge No. 1266, IAM v. Panoramic
Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981) (where a circuit court held that a union is entitled to an
injunction to preserve the status quo against a sale of assets and that pending arbitration of
the union's claim that the seller was in breach of its labor contract for not ensuring that a
purchaser would assume the contract).
2. The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Act) is composed of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (1976)), the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L.
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-187 (1976)), and the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, Tit. VII, 73 Stat. 519 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-160, 164, 186-187 (1976)).
3. "Bargaining agreements" is a term used in labor relations to describe an enforceable
contract between a company and a union setting forth the terms and conditions of employment for a group of employees, usually for a specific period of time.
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an employer's decision to close, partially close, or relocate4 unit
work. In an area historically fraught with confusion over an employer's duties regarding such decisions, 5 it appears that viable
guidelines have begun to emerge. One area of labor law has been
settled since the early years of the National Labor Relations Act:
that is, the exact extent of an employer's duty to bargain with
union representatives concerning the effects of these business decisions.' The remaining confusion had centered around an employer's duty to bargain over the decision itself. A decision made in
order to avoid dealing with a union invites potential charges of discrimination. 7 Further, the danger exists that clauses contained in
the agreement may effectively prohibit some changes during the
term of the contract.8 Without clear-cut guidance from the National Labor Relations Board, the federal courts, and the Act itself,
unwitting employers and unions could find that the provisions for
which they thought they had bargained are the very terms and
conditions limiting their future freedom and bargaining power.
II.

EMPLOYER LIABILITIES UNDER SECTIONS 8(A)(1)

AND

(3):

CHARGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFERENCE AND DISCRIMINATION

Even before a collective bargaining agreement exists, an employer in the midst of a union organizational campaign at his plant
has duties under the Act. The most basic of these duties is to refrain from interfering with or discriminating against the employees' right to self-organize.9 It is an unfair labor practice in violation
4. "Relocation" is a term of art which has no precise legal meaning. In relocation,
essentially identical jobs are available at the new site and employees of the old facility are
either transferred or discharged. Murphy, Plant Relocation and the Collective Bargaining
Obligation, 59 N.C.L. REV. 5, 13 n. 53 (1980).
5. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
6. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 n. 15 (1981).
7. Section 8(a)(3) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(3). Thus, violations of § 8(a)(3) generally require a showing of an employer's intention to discourage union membership.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Section 8(d) demands that the parties maintain all the
"terms and conditions to the contract." Id.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). The statute provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
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of section 8(a)(1)10 for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees engaged in the exercise of rights guaranteed
under section 7 of. the Act. As a result, in the context of plant closings, partial closings, or relocations an employer violates section
8(a)(1) if he threatens to close his plant or eliminate jobs from the
plant should the employees unionize."
More importantly, where a plant is closed or partially closed for
an anti-union purpose, the scope and character of the enterprise
may subject an employer to liability under section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. 2 A major Supreme Court decision concerning section 8(a)(3)
liabilities in the context of plant closures is Textile Workers Union
of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.' 3
Justice Harlan's opinion in Darlingtonpartially defined an employer's liability under the Act with regard to significant reorganizations in its enterprise. 4 In that case, Darlington Manufacturing
Company was a South Carolina corporation which operated one
textile mill.' 5 A majority of the stock in Darlington, however, was
held by Deering Milliken, which was engaged in the business of
marketing textiles produced by others. Further, Roger Milliken,
president of Darlington, controlled Deering Milliken.16
During a Textile Workers Union campaign to organize Darlington's employees, the company fought back through interrogating
employees and warning them that should the union be successful
in an NLRB election, the mill would be closed.17 After Roger Milliken was informed that the union had won the election, he called a
Board of Directors meeting which resulted in a vote to liquidate
the Darlington corporation. 8 The mill was closed shortly thereafauthorized in § 8(a)(3).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
11. See, e.g., Starkville, Inc., 219 NLRB No. 118 (1975) (employer committed unfair
labor practice by predicting plant closure where prediction was not based on objective facts
and therefore constituted an actual threat of plant closure in the event of unionization).
12. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263
(1965). The Court found the question of whether the employer had single employee status
or whether his organization was merely a part of a larger integrated enterprise determinative of employer liability. Id.
13. 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
14. Id, at 265. A clear rule established that "so far as the Labor Relations Act is concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his entire business for any reason he
pleases." Id. at 268.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 266.
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ter and its contents Swere
auctioned off piecemeal." The union
/
challenged the closing by filing unfair labor practice charges asserting violations of sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of the National Labor
Relations Act.2 0
The Board found that Darlington was part of a single integrated
enterprise, Deering Milliken and Company, and had closed due to
the anti-union animus of Roger Milliken." The Corporation was
found by the Board to have violated sections 8(a)(1), (3) and (5) of
the Act by refusing to bargain with the union after closing its
plant.2 2 The Board ordered Deering Milliken to bargain with the
union concerning compliance with its order that all Darlington employees receive back pay until they acquired equivalent employment, or were placed on preferential hiring lists at other Deering
Milliken mills. 2 3 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, however, denied

enforcement, holding that an employer had an absolute right to
close all or part of its business for any reason, including anti-union
hostility.2 4 The union, on grant of certiorari before the Supreme
Court, argued that an employer may not go completely out of business without violating the Act if his action was spurred by a desire
to escape unionization.2 In rejecting this contention, the Court determined that without express legislative authority or judicial precedent, it would not entertain "a proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he wants to."2
Justice Harlan agreed with the Court of Appeals in the view that a
complete termination of business would relieve an employer from
any future inclusion in the Act. 7 In cases of complete cessation of
business the Court observed that "the Act does not compel a person to become or remain an employer. Either may withdraw from
that status with immunity, so long as the obligations of the employment contract have been met. 218 Finding that a complete liquidation of a business, although motivated in large measure by
spite against the union rather than by legitimate business reasons,
19. Id.
20. Id. at 266-67.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 268.
25. Id. at 269-70.
26. Id. at 270.
27. Id. at 274.
28. Id. at 271 (quoting Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 325
F.2d 682, 685 (4th Cir. 1963)).
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is not the type of discrimination which is prohibited by the Act,
the Court distinguished such a closing from other economic weapons used to discourage collective employee activities. 9 Most obvious is the "runaway shop," whereby the employer, in order to
avoid the union, transfers its operations to another plant. Also,
there is the "lockout," a temporary shutdown of a plant to discourage union activity. Both of these economic levers are the type of
employer discrimination which are condemned by the Act, because
one of the purposes of the Act is to prohibit the discriminatory use
of economic weapons in an effort to obtain future benefits.3 0 Where
an employer ceases operations totally, he cannot expect to achieve
a future benefit from discouraging unionization."1 Therefore, the
Court held that "where an employer closes his entire business,
even if the liquidation is motivated by vindictiveness toward the
' 3' 2
union, such action is not an Unfair Labor Practice.
This rule does not apply, however, to situations like Darlington
where the textile mill involved was regarded as an integral part of
the Deering Milliken enterprise. 3 Such a situation may give rise to
the one-sided benefit of increased employer leverage by discouraging union membership at other Milliken controlled mills.3 4 Where
a plant is regarded as an integral part of a larger operation, completely closing down only one plant is thus considered only a partial closing of the entire enterprise.35 In reviewing cases of partial
closure, the Court did not accept the Court of Appeals' rationale
that an employer had an absolute right to close part of its business
without running afoul of section 8(a)(3).3 6 Instead, the Supreme
Court held a partial closing to be an unfair labor practice under
section 8(a)(3), if motivated by a purpose to "chill" unionism in
any of the remaining plants of a single-facility employer, and if the
employer may reasonably have foreseen that such closing would
37
have that effect.
29. 380 U.S. at 272 n.16.
30. Id. at 273-75.
31. Id. at 272.
32. Id. at 274.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 275.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The Court further noted that organizational integration is not the only vital
part to the establishment of such a violation of § 8(a)(3). The Court developed a three part
analysis before imposing liability under § 8(a)(3). "If the persons exercising control over a
plant that is being closed for anti-union reasons:
(1) have an interest in another business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged
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DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER A PARTIAL CLOSING AND SECTION

8(A)(5) OF THE ACT

Darlington concentrated on the section 8(a)(3) implications of
an employer's decision to entirely terminate its business. The case
has been relied upon frequently, however, for the assertion that an
employer's decision to terminate its entire business is beyond the
duty to bargain imposed by section 8(a)(5). 38
Traditionally, where an employer's reorganizational efforts
amounted to a partial closing, an employer was required to bargain
with union representatives regarding his decision to discontinue
unit work.3 9 In Darlington, the Supreme Court analogized the
"runaway shop" scenario to the closing of a department for antiunion reasons where the work is continued by independent contractors.40 In 1964, one year prior to Darlington, the Supreme
Court held in FibreboardPaperProducts v. NLRB,41 that an employer's purely economic decision to subcontract collective bargaining unit work was a "term and condition of employment" rendering it a mandatory subject of bargaining. Failure of an employer
to bargain over a decision to subcontract was held to be in violation of the mandate of section 8(a)(5) to bargain in good faith.42
in the same line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of sufficient substantiality
to give promise of their reaping a benefit from the discouragement of unionization in
that business; (2) act to close their plant with the purpose of producing such a result;
and (3) occupy a relationship to the other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that its employees will fear that such business will also be closed down if they
persist in organizational activities, we think that an unfair labor practice has been
made out."
Id. at 275-76.
In applying the above test to the Board's findings of an integrated enterprise, the Court
realized that the last two criteria, purpose and effect, had been necessarily applied only to
the Darlington mill employees. Therefore, a § 8(a)(3) violation could not be sustained, because there would be no future benefit derived from discouraging union activity of employees already terminated. The case was remanded to the Board for the finding of purpose and
effect. Id. at 275-76. The Board concluded that, indeed, an illegal purpose and effect did
exist. Darlington Mfg. Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1074 (1967), enforced, 397 F.2d 760 (4th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1968).
38. See, e.g., Brockway Motor Trucks Div. of Mack Trucks v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 720,
746 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Royal Planting & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196 (3d Cir.
1965); NLRB v. Burns Int'l. Detective Agency, 346 F.2d 897, 902 (8th Cir. 1965).
39. See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, 161 NLRB 561 (1966).
40. 380 U.S. at 272 n.16.
41. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
42. Id. at 215. In Fibreboard,maintenance services in the company's plant had been
provided by unionized employees. Concerned about the high cost of its maintenance operation, the company undertook a study of the possible cost savings if independent contractors
performed the maintenance work. The company determined that upon expiration of its col-
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In Fibreboard,the Supreme Court observed that the subject of
"contracting out" plant maintenance work previously performed
by employees in the bargaining unit, which the employees were capable of continuing to perform, was within the "literal meaning" of
the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" in section 8(d). 43
"Contracting out" thus became a mandatory item over which the
employer had a duty to bargain in good faith under section
8(a)(5). 4" Before including subcontracting work in the statutory
scope of collective bargaining, the Court looked to the primary
purpose of the Act: promoting the peaceful settlement of industrial
disputes.' 5 Another consideration was the industrial practice in
this country of "contracting out" provisions in numerous collective
bargaining agreements. 4 The Court noted that "[c]ontracting out
work is the basis of many grievances; and that type of claim is grist
'47
in the mills of the arbitrators.
The Court further reasoned that the employer's decision to subcontract unit work constituted the type of undertaking which
could profit from collective bargaining. 4 In the Court's view, inlective bargaining agreement with the union representing maintenance employees, it would
subcontract its maintenance work. The agreement with the union provided for automatic
renewal for another year unless one of the contracting parties gave 60 days notice of a decision to modify or terminate the contract. The agreement was due to expire on July 31. The
union gave notice of its intention to modify on May 26. On July 27, the employer informed
the union during a bargaining session of its decision to subcontract its maintenance work
effective August 1. On July 31, the unionized maintenance employees were terminated. That
same evening the union set up a picket line. Id. at 205-07.
Subsequently, the union filed unfair labor practice charges against the company, alleging
§ 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) violations. The Board found that, although the employer was not
motivated by anti-union animus, by failing to negotiate with the union prior to its decision
to subcontract it had violated § 8(a)(5). Id. at 207-08.
43. Id. at 210.
44. Id. at 209-10. Interpreting § 8(a)(5), the Court stated:
Section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act provides that it shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." Collective bargaining is defined in § 8(d) as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Read together, these provisions establish the obligation of the employer and the representative of its employees
to bargain with each other in good faith with respect to "wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment ...." The duty is limited to those subjects,
and within that area neither party is legally obligated to yield.
Id.
45. Id. at 211.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 212 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574,
584 (1960)).
48. Id. at 213.
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dustrial experience had demonstrated that such decisions could
generally be amicably resolved and that by subcontracting, the employer had merely replaced one group of employees with another
without a substantial change in investment."9
Although Fibreboardis a subcontracting case rather than a partial closing case, it embodies reasoning relevant to other entrepreneurial decisions, including partial closings and relocations.50
Fibreboardsuggests that when an employer's decision is motivated
by labor costs, a subject particularly well suited to bargaining, the
employer has a duty to bargain about the decision.5" In the
Fibreboard Court's opinion, requiring the employer to bargain
under such circumstances would not "significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business." 52
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart sought to confine the
Court's holding to the facts before it, reasoning that by its very
rationale the majority limited its holding only to Fibreboard's
managerial decision to substitute independent contractors for its
particular work.53 Justice Stewart observed further that many
management decisions affect the job security of employees, but
that not all management decisions involve conditions of employment subject to mandatory negotiation with the employees' bargaining representative.5 4
Neither Darlington nor Fibreboard specifically answered the
question concerning whether an employer must bargain over the
49.

Id.

50. Id. at 214. The Court appears to suggest a group of management decisions based
on a belief that "economies could be derived by reducing the work force, decreasing fringe
benefits, and eliminating overtime payments. These have long been regarded as matters peculiarly suitable for resolution within the collective bargaining framework .... Id. at 21314. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas and Harlan, filed a concurring opinion. Id. at
217. He noted:
Yet there are other areas where decisions by management may quite clearly imperil
job security, or indeed terminate employment entirely. An enterprise may decide to
invest in labor saving machinery. Another may resolve to liquidate its assets and go
out of business. Nothing this Court holds today should be understood as imposing a
duty to bargain about such managerial decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control.
Id. at 233.
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
52. 379 U.S. at 213.
53. Id. at 218.
54. Id. at 223. Justice Stewart indicated that: "[d]ecisions concerning the volume and
kind of advertising expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales, all may
bear upon the security of workers' jobs. Yet it is hardly conceivable that such decisions so
involve 'conditions of employment' that they must be negotiated with the employer's bargaining representative." Id.
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decision to partially close. In the wake of these decisions, the
NLRB consistently held that the employer had a duty to bargain
over a decision to partially close.5 5 Most courts of appeal, on the
other hand, were guided by the considerations in Justice Stewart's
5 6 Therefore, great uncertainty
concurrence in Fibreboard.
developed as a result of the Board's attempts to strictly limit various
employer activities, directly conflicting with the findings in most
courts of appeal, that there was no duty to bargain about a decision to partially close or sell the operation, since such a decision
was fundamentally an entrepreneurial judgment that should be left
to management.
In First National Maintenance v. NLRB, 7 the Supreme Court
noted the "continuing disagreement between and among the Board
and the Courts of Appeals" over requiring bargaining about an employer's decision to close part of its business and granted certiorari
to decide the issue. Its holding that an employer had no duty to
bargain with a union representing its employees over an economically motivated decision to close a portion of its business would
have an influential effect on future decisions by the Board and
courts of appeal.5 8 First National Maintenance provided housekeeping and related services to commercial customers.5 9 It hired a
separate group of personnel for each customer and generally the
groups were not transferred among locations.6 The Company
charged a set fee for its labor costs. 1
In 1976, First National Maintenance contracted with Greenpark
Care Center, a nursing home, to provide cleaning services for $500
a week plus labor costs.6 2 Later that year, at the insistence of
Greenpark, the contract fee was reduced to $250 a week. 3 Suffering financial difficulty as a result of this reduction, First National
Maintenance informed Greenpark on July 30, 1977 that unless the
$500 fee was reinstated it would discontinue its services at Greenpark on August 1, 1977.64 On July 12, 1977 the union was certified
55. See, e.g., Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 NLRB 561 (1966); Metro Transp. Servs. Co., 218
NLRB 534 (1975).
56. Irving, Closing and Sales of Businesses-a Settled Area?, 33 LAB. L.J. 218 (1982).
57. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
58. Id. at 681, 686.
59. Id. at 668.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 669.
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at First National Maintenance. 6 5 On July 28, First National Maintenance notified its personnel servicing Greenpark that they would
be terminated on August 1, 1977.6
As a result, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
against First National Maintenance alleging violations of sections
8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act.67 Following a hearing, the Board held
that the company was under a duty to bargain in good faith over
its decision to cease services at Greenpark.6 8 On appeal, the Second
Circuit affirmed the Board's decision and held that while "no per
se rule could be formulated to govern an employer's decision to
close part of its business," section 8(d) nonetheless created a presumption in favor of mandatory bargaining over such a decision. 9
In the court's view, the presumption could be rebutted by a demonstration on the part of the employer that the purposes of the Act
would not be advanced through imposition of a duty to bargain. 0
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Board's per se approach as well as the Second Circuit's presumption analysis."
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun began with the proposition that the Act was not intended to make the union an equal
partner in running the business. He reasoned that "bargaining
over management decisions that have a substantial impact on the
continued availability of employment should be required only if
the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the
'73
business.
In determining whether there was any advantage to be derived
from imposing mandatory bargaining over economically motivated
partial closings, the Court tracked Chief Justice Warren's approach
7
in Fibreboard.
" Noting that the Court in Fibreboard considered
more than simply the "literal meaning" of the Act, 6 Justice Black65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 670.
68. Id. at 671-72.
69. Id. at 672.
70. Id.
71. Id. Justice Blackmun agreed with the Second Circuit that "no per se rule could be
formulated to govern an employer's decision to close part of its business." Id. Justice Blackmun, however, found its presumption analysis "ill-suited to advance harmonious relations
between employer and employee." Id. at 684.
72. Id. at 676.
73. Id. at 679.
74. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
75. 452 U.S. at 679.
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mun then described the character of the employer's decision in
Fibreboard,as no alteration of the Company's basic operation, in
that the company merely replaced existing employees with those of
an independent contractor, to do the same work under similar conditions.7" In Fibreboard,at the root of the employer's decision to
subcontract was a desire to reduce labor costs and the general
7
practice in the industry to bargain over that type of decision.
Such evidence of current labor practice made it evident that the
Fibreboard subject was one amenable to resolution through the
bargaining process. 8 The Fibreboard Court concluded that Congress, in enacting the Act, determined that collective bargaining
was the means best suited to realizing the objectives of the Act.",
Recognizing that a partial closing based on purely economic
grounds might be forestalled by union concessions, Justice Blackmun nevertheless perceived that the union's practical purpose in
negotiating was to delay or halt closing, rather than to arrive at a
feasible solution to the economic problems.80 Justice Blackmun
then considered other means available to protect a union's concern
regarding job security-and prohibition on partial closings to discourage union activity 8"-and concluded that the purposes of the
Act would not be served by requiring negotiations over a decision
to shut down part of a business for economic reasons. s2
Justice Blackmun bolstered this conclusion by discussing the ev83
idence of current labor practice presented in Fibreboard.
According to Justice Blackmun, similar evidence in Fibreboardhad supported mandatory bargaining over the decision to subcontract, but
the fact that contracts rarely included provisions for decision bargaining over partial closings supported that Court's finding that
the subject was inappropriate for bipartisan resolution. "
Finally, the need for certainty led the Supreme Court to adopt a
per se rule that partial closings for economic reasons are not
76. Id. at 679 (quoting Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 231).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 680.
79. Id. at 674. The Court stated: "A fundamental aim of the National Labor Relations
Act is the establishment and maintenance of industrial peace to preserve the flow of interstate commerce . . . . Central to achievement of this purpose is the promotion of collective
bargaining as a method of defusing and channelling conflict between labor and management." Id.
80. Id. at 681.
81. Id. at 681-82.
82. Id. at 682.
83. Id. at 684.
84. Id.
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mandatory subjects of bargaining.15 The Court criticized the Second Circuit's rebuttable presumption rule because under that standard neither management nor labor would know the limits of its
authority.8 6 The Court analogized partial closings to other significant changes in operations, such as opening a new line of business
or going out of business entirely. 7
It was anticipated that First National Maintenance would be
one of the most important labor decisions to come from the Supreme Court in recent years.88 The First National Maintenance
holding was interpreted broadly to support a general rule that decision-bargaining is not required where the scope and direction of
the enterprise is at issue. 9 Rather than presenting a limited factual analysis, the First National Maintenance majority reasoned
that although some decisions have a direct impact on bargaining,
there are areas of general business decisions relating to the nature
and scope of the enterprise which are outside the realm of
mandatory bargaining.9 0 While the Court declined to specifically
address business decisions other than partial closings, its treatment of partial closings provided a needed guide to the NLRB in
making rulings concerning decision bargaining over plant relocation, sales, automation and the like.9 1 Established guidelines for
each area of decisionmaking would avoid confusion for both management and labor.
85. Id. at 686.
86. Id. at 684.
87. Id. at 688. The Court did not find determinative the amount of capital expended
in deciding whether the employer's decision represented a significant change in operations.
Id.
88. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. 452 U.S. at 676-77. The Court categorized management decisions as follows: category I decisions have only an indirect and attenuated impact on the employment relationship; category II decisions are almost exclusively an aspect of the employment relationship;
and category III decisions resemble First National Maintenance, where the impact was directly on employment, but the focus was wholly apart from the employment relationship.
Id.
91. The NLRB's General Counsel advocated a broad reading of the Act. See, Advice
Memorandum of NLRB General Counsel, 108 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1981). Therein, a Regional
Director was advised to withdraw a complaint against Swift & Company for refusing to
bargain about its decision to close one of its plants. He cited First NationalMaintenance as
controlling "because the Employer's decision. . . was based solely on economic factors." Id.
at 1072. In General Counsel Memorandum 81-57, Nov. 30, 1981, the Regional Directors were
advised to dismiss complaints in virtually all cases of financially motivated partial closings.
The General Counsel distinguished other types of management decisions but advised application of the First National Maintenance balancing test in analyzing them. Id. at 68.
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THE DUTY TO BARGAIN OVER RELOCATION OF UNIT WORK

More often than not, an employer's decision to close or eliminate
work at a particular location is related to business judgments other
than the desire to avoid dealing with a union; rarely does an employer simply cease to service a customer in that area. Such a closing is more commonly related to a finding that customers can better be serviced from another location.
Prior to First National Maintenance, the Board consistently
held that an employer must bargain over its decision to relocate
unit work. 92 Subsequently, the Board reiterated its general rule in
93
Otis Elevator Co.
In Otis Elevator, the company operated an outdated unionized
plant in New Jersey. 4 As part of a plan to reorganize and update
its entire research and development operation, the company spent
more than three million dollars to build a new research and development center in Connecticut. 5 Subsequently, during the term of
its collective bargaining agreement, the company transferred the
research and development operations to the new facility and relocated 17 of its 350 bargaining-unit employees."6 This action was
97
taken without first bargaining with the union over the decision.
The union filed charges with the Board, alleging that Otis had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act by refusing to bargain with
unit representatives over its decision and the effects of that decision. 98 The Board held Otis had violated section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.99
The company, relying on Justice Stewart's concurrence in
Fibreboard, contended that the decision to relocate was not a
mandatory subject of bargaining, having been removed from the
92. See, e.g., Standard Handkerchief Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 15 (1965); Weltronic Co., 173
N.L.R.B. 235 (1968), enforced, 419 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1969); Stone and Thomas, 221
N.L.R.B. 573 (1975); Coated Products, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 159 (1978), enforced, 106
L.R.R.M. 2364 (3d Cir. 1980); Otis Elevator Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981), rev'd, 269
N.L.R.B. No. 162 (1984).
93. 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981).
94. Id. at 241.
95. Id. at 236.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 241. Aside from the allegations concerning refusal to bargain over the decision and its effects, the complaint also alleged that the company violated §§ 8(a)(1) and (5)
of the Act by not furnishing to the union requested information relevant to the decision,
and dealing directly with the employees, thus bypassing the union as the exclusive bargaining representative. Id.
99. Id. at 237-38.
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realm of section 8(d) because it involved a significant withdrawal
of capital affecting the ultimate direction and shift of the enterprise; a decision lying at the very core of entrepreneurial control.'0 0
Otis further argued that its freedom to invest capital and manage
the enterprise would be abridged significantly if the company was
forced to bargain over such decisions. 10' The Board, however, adhered to its per se rule requiring decision bargaining over relocations.'10 Three months after the Board in Otis Elevator held that
Otis had violated the Act by refusing to bargain for relocation of
unit work, First National Maintenance was decided.
Subsequently, the Board's membership changed as a result of
several appointments by the Reagan Administration and it became
apparent that a newly constituted Board would reverse some of the
decisional trends established by the Board under the Carter Administration.' 3 Although there was conflicting speculation concerning likely changes in Board policy, most commentators advocated the need for change in the Board's approach to bargaining
obligations predicate to plant and work relocations."0 The current
Board did reverse the Board's prior policy regarding plant relocations, and the change first became apparent in 1984 when it reconsidered two important cases: Otis Elevator Co. and Milwaukee
Spring v. NLRB 0 5
In Otis Elevator II,10 the employer's bargaining obligations
under section 8(a)(5) were specifically reconsidered in light of the
100. Id. at 247.
101. Id. at 246.
102. Id. at 246-47.
103. Address by Former NLRB Member Peter Walther on Future NLRB Direction,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 25, at F-1 (Feb. 4, 1983). Walther discusses the appointments of
Donald Dotson as the expected new chairman, and Patricia Diaz Dennis as a new member.
Walther approved of the appointees' backgrounds, observing that for the first time in many
years, out of its five person membership, two members will have reasonably extensive and
meaningful experience in active industrial relations. Id.
Walther predicted a movement back from the tilt to the lift that had occurred, especially
in the late Seventies. The "Board will be moved in those areas back from far left field where
it has been roaming in its decision making and back into at least the area of short stop or
second base. I doubt that it will move very far, if at all, into right field." Id. But cf., Irving,
NLRB as Change Approaches, LAB. L. DEVS. (MB) 74, at 84-85 (1984), where the former
General Counsel predicted a reversal of the Carter Board law on plant relocations.
104. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. See also Harper, Leveling the Road
from Borg-Warner to First National Maintenance:the Scope of Mandatory Bargaining,68
VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982).
105. Otis Elevator Co., 255 N.L.R.B. 235 (1981); Milwaukee Spring Division of Illinois
Coil Spring Co., 265 N.L.R.B. No. 28 (1982).
106. 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1984).
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Supreme Court's approach in First National Maintenance.107 The
new Board concluded that the employer's decision to consolidate
and transfer research and development functions from one facility
to another was not a mandatory subject of bargaining under section 8(d). Therefore, his refusal to bargain over the decision did
not violate section 8(a)(5)." o'
Otis Elevator H reflects three separate interpretations of First
National Maintenance, with Chairman Dotson's position representing the majority approach.1 0 9 Dotson recognized that the Court
in First National Maintenance reserved from its ruling questions
concerning whether plant relocations, sales, and various kinds of
subcontracting and automation were excluded from mandatory
bargaining.11 0 In light of that Court's rejection of the former
Board's per se approach, Chairman Dotson tracked the Court's reliance on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Fibreboard."
Chairman Dotson applied the balancing test of First National
Maintenance to plant relocations, quoting:
Management must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to
the extent essential for the running of a profitable business ....
[B]argaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact on
the continued availability of employment should be required only if the
benefit, for labor management relations and the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business.' 12

The Board's determination that the Otis relocation was based
upon improving its research and development and product marketability1 3 was important. The Board observed that in categorizing a
subject as mandatory, it is critically important to reveal the essence of the decision, that is, whether it turns upon a change in the
nature or direction of the business, or merely upon labor costs." 4
In contrast, a decision's effect on employees or the union's ability
to offer concessions, the Board maintained, is not an important
107.
108.
109.

115 L.R.R.M. 1281.

Id.
Id. Member Zimmerman filed a separate opinion, concurring and dissenting in

part. Id. at 1284. Member Dennis filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1286.
110.

Id. at 1283.

111. Id. To reiterate, Justice Stewart would have excluded from § 8(d) all those decisions which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control, and voiced a concern that the majority
holding would be held to impose a duty to bargain over those decisions. See supra note 50
and accompanying text.
112. 115 L.R.R.M. at 1282 (quoting 452 U.S. at 678-79).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1282-83.
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consideration." 5 The Board concluded that the instant decision
clearly turned on a fundamental change in the nature and direction of the business,"0 and thus was not a decision amenable to
bargaining." 7 Similarly, the Board held that decisions affecting the
scope, direction or nature of an enterprise (such as sales or partial
sales, disposal of assets, consolidation) some subcontracting, and
automation were excluded from section 8(d) of the Act. " 8
To clarify the scope of the present Board's position, Chairman
Dotson stated that in the past, the Board's decisions reflected a
"knee-jerk" response to "subcontracting decisions" as requiring
bargaining. " 9 In the future, he explained, the Board would no
longer mechanically "label" a decision a subject of mandatory bargaining.120 The crucial inquiry, according to Chairman Dotson, will
be whether the business decision turns upon a change in basic operation or merely upon a reduction of labor costs.' 2 ' Therefore, included in section 8(d), in accordance with the teachings of
Fibreboard and First National Maintenance, are all decisions
22
which turn upon a reduction of labor costs.
Taking a pragmatic approach to this area, Chairman Dotson recognized that managerial changes will frequently involve elements
of more than one type of decision with labor costs among the considerations.12 3 However, he reasoned that if labor costs constitute
an important factor, management has an incentive to confer voluntarily with the union, where union concessions may influence a de1 24
cision, if they would make continuing the business profitable.
Where labor costs are but one of several factors, labor costs could
12 5
be adequately dealt with during effects bargaining.
Member Zimmerman filed a concurring and dissenting opinion
in which he took a different approach to plant relocation decision
bargaining.' 2 6 In his analysis, bargaining over an employer's decision to relocate work is mandatory when the decision is amenable
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1283.
at 1283 n.5.

at 1284.

at 1284.
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to resolution through collective bargaining." 7 Amenability is determined by examining the underlying reasons for the removal. 8 An
employer's decision is amenable to bargaining where union concessions may substantially mitigate the concerns underlying the employer's decision. 2 9 By contrast, when a union has no control over
or ability to affect reasons underlying a decision, bargaining cannot
lead to a mutually acceptable solution. 30
Member Dennis' concurring opinion proposed a two step analysis. 1 31 She began with the premise that relocation and consolidation, like partial closings, are decisions which FirstNational Maintenance categorized as Category III decisions (having direct impact
on employment but focusing on the economic profitability of the
enterprise), and give rise to a concern wholly apart from the employment relationship.1 32 According to Member Dennis, a first step
in determining whether bargaining should be required over Category III management decisions is to determine whether the decision is amenable to bargaining.13 The amount of control the union
has over the decision is a key factor in ascertaining amenability to
bargaining.1 3 ' If the decision is one amenable to bargaining, a second step would require bargaining only if the benefit outweighed
the burden. 3 5 Where the burden elements are weighty, the business decision at issue is not one of a mandatory nature.'3 6
Otis Elevator H is the most important Board decision concerning an employer's duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) since the
Supreme Court decided First National Maintenance. Although
the Board could not agree upon one approach to the duty to bargain, it is important that the members came to the same
conclusion.

127. Id. at 1285.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1286.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1288.
134. Id.
135. Id. Burden elements include but are not limited to the following: (a) extent of
capital commitment; (b) extent of changes in operations; (c) need for speed; (d) need for
flexibility; and, (e) need for confidentiality. Id.
136. Id. at 1288.
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CONTRACT ASPECTS OF CLOSING, PARTIAL CLOSING, AND PLANT
RELOCATION: MID-CONTRACT RESTRICTIONS ON REORGANIZATION

Until 1974, the main problem concerning relocation of unit work
centered upon an employer's duty to bargain in good faith with the
union to impasse over a purely economic decision not motivated by

anti-union animus. 137 The Board's decision in University of Chicago v. NLRB, 138 however, represents a novel approach to plant
relocation. After University of Chicago, assuming that an employer
has fulfilled his bargaining obligation, and that the agreement itself contains no specific prohibitions on relocation, the employer
might still be restricted from transferring bargaining unit work
during the effective period of the agreement. 139 Under proper circumstances, the University of Chicago Board determined that a
mid-contract transfer would result in an unlawful midterm modification of the contract. 4 0
In University of Chicago, the Board held that a university's unilateral removal of bargaining unit work from union jurisdiction
during midterm of the collective bargaining agreement constituted
an unlawful modification of the contract's recognition clause in violation of section 8(d). 4 1 The Board also found an unlawful modification of the wage provisions of the agreement, because in transferring unit employees and giving them a pay cut, those unit
employees' pay scale was altered. 4 2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit denied enforcement of the
Board's decision and order in University of Chicago, and concluded that absent specific prohibitions in the bargaining agreement, an employer was free to transfer work out of the bargaining
unit if he bargained over his decision to impasse and he was not
motivated by anti-union animus. 13 The court found determinative
137. See-generally cases cited supra notes 38-136 and accompanying text.
138. 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enforcement denied, 514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975). The
Board described the framework as involving a determination of whether an employer may
transfer bargaining unit work during the effective period of the collective bargaining agreement despite the fact that (1) such transfers are not prohibited by the contract, (2) the
employer bargains in good faith with the union to impasse and (3) the employer is not
motivated by anti-union animus. 514 F.2d at 949.
139. Id.
140. 210 N.L.R.B. at 198.
141. Id. at 199. The recognition clause in a collective bargaining agreement merely
acknowledges a union as the exclusive bargaining representative for employees in their specific job classifications. Id. at 193-94.
142. Id. at 198.
143. 514 F.2d at 949.
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the fact that the University's only motivation for the transfer was
1 44
the need to improve sanitary conditions in the hospital complex.
Three years later, in Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. A Division of Missions Marine Associates, Inc.,14 5 despite the contrary
holding in the Seventh Circuit, the Board again ruled that an employer who relocated bargaining unit work during the term of the
collective bargaining agreement violated sections 8(a)(1), (3), and
(5).146 Violations were found despite the fact that the employer
had fulfilled his bargaining obligations in good faith and that his
actions were taken for purely economic reasons. 147 This time, the
Ninth Circuit enforced the Board's decision and order because it
considered the employer's actions a midterm repudiation of the
14 8
collective bargaining agreement.
In 1982, the Board reaffirmed its reasoning in University of Chicago and Los Angeles Marine, holding in Milwaukee Spring Co.,
that an employer violated section 8(a)(1), (3), (5) and section
8(d) 14'9 by transferring its assembly work, during a mid-contract
period from a unionized plant to a non-union plant after negotiating unsuccessfully for wage concessions with the union. 15° Prior to
its decision to transfer, the company had lost a major customer
with a resulting $200,000 a month decrease in revenue.1 51 In this
instance, both parties stipulated that the move was based only on
the higher labor costs in the collective bargaining agreement, and
that the employer had complied with his duty to bargain over the
decision and was at all times agreeable to effects bargaining. 152
Again, finding that the contract contained no specific restrictions
on transfer rights, the Board held that transfer of assembly operations motivated by higher union wage scales amounted to an unlawful midterm modification within the meaning of section 8(d).' 5 3
144. Id.
145. 235 N.L.R.B. 720 (1978). After failing to obtain wage concessions from its recreational sales employees, the company, facing a substantial operating loss at its facility, announced that it was relocating its recreational sales operations to two other plants. Id. at
722. The employer then terminated all 23 unit employees and relocated its operation. Id. at
724-25.
146. Id. at 737-38.
147. Id. at 732-33.
148. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. N.L.R.B., 602 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1979).
149. 265 N.L.R.B. No. 28, 111 L.R.R.M. 1486 (1982).
150. Id at 1487.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1490. Chairman Van de Water stated that his finding of violation rested on
the parties' stipulation that the employees' transfer of assembly operations was motivated
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Not surprisingly, the Board's decision met with criticism from
those who espoused the traditional approach to collective bargaining. 15" In essence, if employment costs were a factor, the decision
gave a union veto power over plant relocations during the term of
the contract, even if motivated by purely economic considerations. 155 The Board's view was built upon the fiction that collective
bargaining agreements are the equivalent of work guarantees. 156 In
Milwaukee Spring I, the Board ignored the principle that management retains certain inherent rights unless knowingly and affirmatively waived. 157 The Board was also criticized for engaging in convoluted, unwarranted, and unsupportable contract analysis when
the interpretation of labor contracts has traditionally been within
the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators. 158 The Board's interpretation in Milwaukee Spring I created no incentive for a union to
negotiate solutions to an employer's serious economic problems. 59
Following the Board's decision and order, the employer filed a
petition for review with the Seventh Circuit, and the Board filed a
cross-application seeking enforcement of its order. 6 0 On August 4,
1983, the court granted the present Board's motion to remand the
petition to the Board for additional consideration. On reconsideration, the Board reversed its decision and dismissed the case.1 6 '
The Board began with the general principle that even after
reaching a good faith impasse in decision bargaining, section 8(d)
imposes an additional requirement when an agreement is in effect
and the employer seeks to "modif[y] . . . the terms and conditions
contained in" the contract.16 2 Under section 8(d), the employer
must obtain the union's permission before implementing the
by comparatively higher union wage rates and an inadequate return on investment. Id. at
1490 n.7.
154. See, Irving, NLRB as Change Approaches, LAB. L. DEVS. (MB) 75, at 84-85. The
author notes that in reviewing Board decisional trends, it is easy to guess where changes are
needed. Milwaukee Spring was used to exemplify the then current view. Id.
155. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
156. Irving, supra note 103 at 84.
157. Id. at 85.
158. Id.
159. See generally, Plant Relocation Issues, N.Y. CN. LAB. (MB)
16.02[4] n.73
(1984).
160. Milwaukee Spring Division of Ill. Coil Spring v. N.L.R.B., 268 N.L.R.B. 601
(1984).
161. Id. at 601.
162. Id. at 602. (citing,Oak Cliff Golman Baking Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 1063, 85 L.R.R.M.
1035 (1973), enforced, 505 F.2d 1302, 90 L.R.R.M. 2615 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 826 (1975)).
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change.16 3 If the employment conditions sought to be changed are
not contained in the contract, however, the employer's obligation
will be limited to the general requirement of bargaining in good
faith to impasse over the subject prior to instituting the proposed
16 4
change.
The Board next sought to identify which specific term or condition contained in the contract had been modified by the employer's
actions.'6 5 Observing that the Milwaukee Spring I panel never
specified any contract term modified by the employer's actions, the
Milwaukee H Board was unable to identify a clause upon which
the former panel specifically relied.' 6 Instead, the Milwaukee H
Board perceived that the former Board, finding that labor costs
were stipulated as the basis for the move, rested its ruling on an
implied modification of the wage and benefits provision.' 7 The
Milwaukee H Board found that the employer left the wage and
benefits provisions intact after he failed to obtain the union's consent to a wage and benefits modification. 66 Instead, the company
decided to relocate its assembly operations to a non-union plant
whose workers were not subject to the contract.'6 9 The Board held
that the employer did not violate section 8(d) by unilaterally modi70
fying the wage and benefits provisions.'
Taking its analysis further, the Board noted that in previous
cases the NLRB had utilized the recognition clause to hold that an
employer's reassignment of unit work unlawfully modified terms
and conditions contained in the contract."7 Agreeing with the reviewing courts of appeal, the Board explained that recognition
clauses merely recognized the contract's coverage of certain employees, without also endowing them with a specific territorial or
jurisdictional right.'7 2 Such rights can only be obtained through a
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Chairman Dotson emphasized that the specific term identified must be contained in the contract.
167. Id.
168. Id. Chairman Dotson noted that although a proposal to modify the wage and
benefits provisions was originally presented, the company abandoned the proposals after the
union rejected them. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1067.
171. Id. The Board cited two cases: Boeing Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 696 (1977), enf. denied
581 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1978); University of Chicago, 210 N.L.R.B. 190 (1974), enf. denied
514 F.2d 942 (7th Cir. 1975).
172. Id. at 602.
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work preservation clause, a commonly sought provision during contract negotiations, and one which neither party expects will be im173
plied without bargaining.
The Board concluded that neither clause amounts to an implied
work preservation clause. 174 The Board ulitimately held that absent a specific provision in the contract, an employer does not violate the duty to bargain when it institutes a mid-contract decision
to relocate operations, since such a change does not constitute a
modification of terms and conditions of employment "contained
175
in" the agreement.
The Board set forth general policy considerations beyond its
holding. Taking a traditional approach to collective bargaining, it
is the Board's desire to promote realistic and meaningful collective
bargaining through truthful midterm bargaining regarding decisions to transfer unit work. 1 6 Under the Milwaukee Spring H approach, an employer has an incentive to reveal the considerations
involved in his decision without fear of the union's former veto
power. 17 7 Informed of the reasons underlying the proposed move, a
union would be motivated to make concessions if it appeared pos78
sible to achieve a bipartisan resolution through bargaining.1
Some concern has been expressed over the possibility that the
unions will seek implied contractual restrictions through arbitration, even absent express language prohibiting transfers. 17 Instead,
it is hoped that Milwaukee Spring II will aid employers and employees in resolving conflicts through more meaningful bargaining.
VI.

CONCLUSION

At the core of a healthy economy is the employer, whose ability
to implement business decisions, in the aggregate, will enhance economic growth nationally, if not overly restrained by statutory obligations to bargain to impasse with the union over every decision
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 603.
176. Id. at 605. The Board determined that Los Angeles Marine & Milwaukee I discouraged truthful midterm bargaining over decisions to transfer unit work. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Report of Law and Legislation Committee, National Academy of Arbitrators,
37th Annual Meeting (May 1984). Milwaukee Spring H is especially significant in the context of arbitration in view of the possibility that unions will now turn to the arbitral forum
in the hope that arbitrators will prove more disposed than the Board to find implied contractual restrictions. Id. at 12.
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which will affect future employment. The Supreme Court's decision in First National Maintenance and its enthusiastic acceptance by the present NLRB has finally given the employer muchneeded guidance in determining the extent of its bargaining obligations under the NLRA, should it decide to close or partially close a
plant, or relocate unit work from one plant to another. Under the
current law, an employer is under no duty to bargain with union
representatives over an economically motivated decision to close a
portion of its enterprise, whether an entire plant or merely one department, or relocate union work. Where union concessions, however, would alleviate an employer's economic problems because labor costs are a substantial factor in the business decision, then the
employer is required to bargain in good faith to impasse. In that
scenario, both labor and management have an incentive to confer
voluntarily prior to the change.
Aside from clarifying the employer's duty to bargain over a business decision, First National Maintenanceand subsequent Dotson
Board rulings have minimized the section 8(d) restrictions on midcontract reorganizations which were significant deterrents to any
unilateral employer action under the Carter Board. Without specific provisions in the contract limiting an employer's mid-contract
decision to reorganize, an employer may now implement his decision without fear that implied terms and conditions of employment
will give rise to a section 8(d) unfair labor practice charge. Thus,
where formerly the union held veto power over reorganizations
during the term of the collective bargaining agreement, management need no longer win the right to reorganize through negotiation where labor cost is not a substantial factor in its decision.
Although developments discussed in this comment illustrate a
drastic change in Board policy over recent years, the Dotson
Board's rulings in Milwaukee Spring H and Otis Elevator H do
more toward encouraging meaningful collective bargaining than
the decisions which they overturned. Further, under the 1982 Milwaukee Spring I decision, the Carter Board did nothing to conserve jobs or forestall employers' decisions to relocate work. An
employer could quietly plan its move, and postpone the announcement to its employees until the termination of the contract. In
light of present Board policy, an employer has a positive incentive
to notify union employees of its intentions before a serious downturn in business could destroy the parties' opportunity to save
jobs.
As a whole, the changes in the area of unfair labor practice and
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contractual aspects of plant closings, partial closings, and relocations of unit work have reflected a recent awareness that the free
flow of capital and the freedom to contract are fundamental to economic growth, diversification, and this cbuntry's ability to withstand further economic erosion from foreign competition.
Claudia Wickham Lane

